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Abstract 
Islamic finance continues to gain popularity regionally, internationally and both among the Muslim 
and non-Muslim countries. The Islamic Financial Institution (IFI) differs from its conventional 
counterpart in its governance structure. It is imperative for the IFI to maintain Shari’ah compliance in 
all its dealings. Hence, an essential element in the IFI is its Shari’ah Supervisory Board (SSB) and its 
Shari’ah Governance system. This paper empirically examines the SSB’s structure, and Shari’ah 
supervision function directly from the SSB members themselves. Right from their appointment, 
mandates and responsibiities, how they function, to their views on Shari’ah risk, Shari’ah compliance, 
and to how Shari’ah review and reporting is performed. The findings reveal issues related to the flow 
of information, governance of SBB and independence of Shari’ah supervision and Shari’ah review as 
some of the key issues that would need to be addressed/strengthened to enhance confidence, and 
contribute to the credibility of the of IFI and the Islamic finance market. The opinions expressed are 
towards having some regulatory involvement that would contribute to the enhancement of supervision.  
 
Highlights 
 Being in line with Shari’ah, is paramount to the IFI maintaining its creditability. 
 SSB members prefer having some form of obligations, so that everything is clear. 
 The selection process of the SSB members is not completely independent. 
 Independence is an important element in the Shari’ah governance framework. 
 Shari’ah compliance is maintained through performing Shari’ah audit. 
 Details of the outcome of the Shari’ah audit performed is not always reported. 
 
Keywords 
Shari’ah Supervisory Board, Shari’ah Governance, Shari’ah independence, Islamic Financial 
Institutions, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). 
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Exploring the Workings of the Shari’ah Supervisory Board in Islamic Finance: 
Perspective of Shari’ah Scholars from the GCC 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
A unique feature of Islamic finance is the compliance of its products and operations with 
Shari’ah principles and values. The requirement of Shari’ah compliance introduces two 
essential risks: Shari’ah risk and legal risk. Shari’ah risk occurs when an Islamic Financial 
Institution (IFI) fails to comply with Shari’ah rules and principles. Legal risk arises when an 
IFI enters into/undertakes an investment contract and fails to validate and meet the terms of 
the undertaking/contract (Ginena, 2015:85). These two risks are somewhat related: the terms 
of a contractual relationship is set in line with Shari’ah rules and principles, and, by 
maintaining and abiding by the Shari’ah rules and principles, non-compliance of both risks 
can be reduced. The IFI non-compliance of the two Shari’ah related risks can result in both 
financial and non-financial consequences. The non-compliance could invalidate the 
investment contract and/or generate non-halal income which has to be set aside and cannot be 
added into the income of the IFI. This, along with legal risks arising in legal disputes, can 
tarnish their reputation and thus affect their future business/investments (Ginena & Hamid, 
2015: 84-85; Hamza, 2013: 227). Thus, there is a need to introduce a proper Shari’ah 
governance system/framework to ensure the Shari’ah compliance of products and operations.   
International standard setting bodies such as the Accounting and Auditing Organization 
for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) and the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) 
have come up with guidelines that define the parameters of a sound Shari’ah governance 
regime. A key element of this framework is a Shari’ah Supervisory Board (SSB) made up of 
a number of Shari’ah scholars who review and approve all the products offered by the IFI.  
While some countries’ regulators require Islamic banks to set up Shari’ah governance 
structures that include an independent SSB, other jurisdictions do not have any 
legal/regulatory framework. In these countries, Shari’ah governance and the SSB are 
instituted by Islamic financial institutions to gain the trust of Muslim customers. However, 
lack of clear regulatory guidelines can compromise the independence of the SSB and dilute 
Shari’ah compliance (Alkhamees, 2012). 
While there is a large literature discussing various issues related to Shari’ah governance 
structures and regimes (Ahmed, 2011; Grais & Pellegrinni, 2006; Rammal, 2006; Suleiman, 
2000; Alman, 2012; Grass, 2013; Malkawi, 2013; Injas et al., 2016), studies examining the 
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operations of the SSB are rare.  As such, very little is known about the way the SSB operates 
and how decisions are made. This paper contributes to this specific area by exploring the 
black-box and presenting the views of Shari’ah scholars on different aspects of Shari’ah 
governance in IFIs. Specifically, the paper presents the opinions of 13 Shari’ah scholars from 
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) region gathered through interviews on various issues 
related to Shari’ah governance such as SSB structure, framework and Shari’ah process and 
views on the strengths and weaknesses of the current practice. 
 
2. SHARI’AH GOVERNANCE: AN OVERVIEW OF THE STANDARDS AND 
LITERATURE 
The Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) defines Shari’ah non-compliance risk as “The 
risk that arises from the IIFS’s failure to comply with the Shari’ah rules and principles 
determined by the Shari’ah board of the IIFS or the relevant Body in the Jurisdiction in 
which the IIFS operates” (IFSB-5, 2005: 26). It puts forth the requirements for a Shari’ah 
governance system that the supervisory authorities are recommended to implement. 
According to Principle 1.2 of IFSB-10, the IFI, upon appointment of an independent SSB, 
should have in place “…clear terms of reference regarding its mandates and 
responsibilities… well defined operating procedures and line of reporting…” (IFSB-10, 2009: 
9). The supervisory authority is to ensure that the IFI has a proper pre- and post-Shari’ah 
compliance monitoring mechanism in place (IFSB-10-3).
1
 
AAOIFI’s governance standards lists the three main key components of Shari’ah 
supervision and compliance for the IFIs as follows: Shari’ah Supervisory Board, Shari’ah 
Review and Internal Shari’ah Review. In the AAOIFI Governance Standards (GS-1), the IFI 
is to have an independent Shari’ah Supervisory Board (SSB) to be appointed/dismissed by 
the shareholders upon nomination of the board of directors (GS-1/3 and GS-1/8)
2
. The IFI is 
to have a minimum of three SSB members and the agreed terms of engagement are to be 
recorded in the appointment letter signed between the IFI and the SSB member (GS-1/4). 
Furthermore, the SSB “shall appoint from among its members or any person a supervisor(s) 
to help it in performing its duties" (GS-1/6). In addition, to reduce the risk of independence of 
the SSB, the SSB is to be rotated every 5 years
3
. 
                                                          
1  IFSB. (2009). Guiding Principles on Shari'ah Governance Systems                                                                                                                                                                               
For Institutions Offering Islamic Financial Services-IFSB 10. 
2 AAOIFI Governance Standards (1): “Shari’a Supervisory Board: Appointment, Composition and Report”. 
3 AAOIFI Governance standard (5): “Independence of Shari’a Supervisory Board”. 
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The Shari’ah compliance system is an ongoing process that starts at the pre-investment 
stage and continues in the post-investment phase. As can be seen from Figure 1 below, the 
process begins from the inception stage. This is followed by the pre-launch/pre-entry to the 
product/investment stage and then to agreeing on the structure/legal set-up followed by 
documenting and obtaining the SSB’s approval and continuing through to the post 
launch/investment/transaction stage with a proper implementation. This is followed-up by a 
review and audit by examination and evaluation of the extent of compliance. Then, the 
outcome of the proper execution is reported and any non-compliance matters are rectified. 
Failure to do so (rectifying non-compliance) could result in enforcement measures either by 
the regulator (withdrawal of license) or by the court (due to a legal case against the IFI by 
investors) (Adawiah, 2012).   
Figure 1: Mechanism of Shari'ah Compliance Process 
 
Shari’ah compliance/assurance is maintained by the Shari’ah compliance review/audit that is 
carried out by the Shari’ah Review. The IFSB principles refer to both internal and external 
Shari’ah compliance review. Principle 3.1 (clause 107) of IFSB-3 stipulates that the IFI 
should undertake internal Shari’ah compliance review to follow-up on the implementation 
and to monitor Shari’ah compliance. In addition, Principle 3.1 (clause 106) of IFSB-3 
maintains that Shari’ah review is to take place following the issuing of the SSB 
 
1. 
Inception & 
Conceptualization 
2. 
Structuring 
3. 
Approval/Documentation 
4. 
Execution & 
Implementation 
6. 
Audit (Independent) 
5. 
Review 
7. 
Rectify/Report 
8. 
Recovery 
Mechanisms/Disputes 
Post-Investment: 
Pre-Investment: 
Consequence of non-compliance 
Source: Adapted and formatted from Adawiah, 2012 
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decision/ruling to ensure its compliance with the ruling through an external Shari’ah review.  
Meanwhile, the AAOIFI Shari’ah governance standards4 place obligations on the IFI for a 
quarterly internal Shari’ah review to be performed on the Shari’ah compliance of the IFI, in 
line with the Shari’ah Supervisory Board’s (SSB) approvals/decisions. Furthermore, the IFI’s 
SSBs are to review and determine whether the investments entered into by the IFI are (and 
continue to be) Shari’ah compliant throughout the investment term, and to produce an annual 
Shari’ah compliance report on the matter. The Shari’ah compliance review/audit report that 
is prepared by the SSB (with the assistance of the IFI’s internal Shari’ah department report5) 
is to be reviewed by the external auditor of the IFI and will then form part of the annual 
financial report
6
. The AAOIFI standards, at the time of conducting the study/interviews, did 
not specify that an external Shari’ah audit is to be performed by an external Shari’ah 
party/auditor.
7
 Rather, the requirement of an external audit is embedded within the 
requirement of issuing the external audit of the financial statement. The SSBs are required to 
report any violations in their opinion statement in the SSB report that they produce.
8
 
Although the standards do not specifically address the details of the format of the Shari’ah 
decision/fatwa, when the SSB produces the Shari’ah decision/fatwa it is expected that it is 
detailed, clear and transparent so as to increase awareness.
9
  
Independence is an important element in the Shari’ah governance framework. It adds 
creditability and enhances confidence (public confidence) in the IFI. The IFSB in its 
definition of Shari’ah governance system emphasises the importance of independence by 
stating: “A set of institutional and organizational arrangements through which IFIs ensure 
that there is an effective independent oversight of Shari’ah compliance over the issuance of 
relevant Shari’ah pronouncements…dissemination of information and ….an internal 
Shari’ah compliance review” (IFSB-10, 2009, 2-3). However, the matter of effective 
implementation of independence has resulted in differences in opinion. In AAOIFI, the 
independence is reflected in the requirement that the internal Shari’ah review is to be carried 
out by “an independent division/department or part of the internal audit department, 
                                                          
4 AAOIFI Governance Standards (3.20). 
5 AAOIFI Governance Standard (3.20) 
6 AAOIFI Auditing Standards (4). 
7 AAOIFI, in December 2016 following the conclusion of its 3rd Governance and Ethics Board meeting, announced that it 
was working on standards on External Shari’ah Audit, which were issued later in March 2018. The AAOIFI standards set 
out the principles applicable to the external Shari’ah audit that is conducted by an independent external Shari’ah auditor.  
The role of an external Shari’ah audit is to provide independent assurance to ensure compliance of an IFI with the Shari’ah 
principles and rules (AAOIFI-Audit Standards (AS)-6:7-8). The standards encourage IFIs to have at least one external 
Shari’ah audit a year, in line with the standards. These standards are officially effective for the external Shari’ah auditor’s 
report covering periods on or after 1st January 2019. 
8 AAOIFI Governance Standard (1.21). 
9 IFSB-3.54. 
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depending on the size of an IFI, it shall be established within the IFI to examine and evaluate 
the extent of compliance with the IFI’s SSB…” (AAOIFI GS-3). In addition, the SSB is to 
produce a report at the end of the year on the extent of the IFI’s Shari’ah compliance 
(AAOIFI-GS-2). Such steps in establishing independence have generated some concerns.  
Concerns arise from the SSBs having to produce an independent opinion where conflicts 
of interest may exist. The independence can be affected when the SSB has some form of 
“economic stake” (remuneration and renewal) with the IFI, in addition to basing its review on 
the internal Shari’ah department that also has some economic stake with the IFI (Grais & 
Pellegrini, 2006).  Furthermore, the SSB members will be expressing their opinion on the 
level of compliance of a Shari’ah matter that they have already given approval on earlier 
based on the details and information provided beforehand (Hamza, 2013: 228). To remedy 
this, there are suggestions in the industry to rotate the SSB, as has been the case with auditors. 
However, rotating the whole board could compromise the quality of audit since the new 
board would not be familiar with the IFI’s business and its management (FEE, 2004). Grais 
and Pellegrini (2006: 16), in defence of the arguments of the proposals to rotate the SSB in 
order to achieve greater independence and the inefficiencies that may result (from the 
experience faced with internal auditors in the past) suggest that: “an alternative may be found 
in the practice of periodically rotating SSB members rather the entire boards. This would 
infuse fresh approaches in the SSB and may increase independence through peer review; it 
would not necessarily compromise audit quality, as the continuing members would assure 
continuity”.   
Moreover, independence could be increased by delinking the economic benefits of the 
SSB from the IFI to an independent body. Hamza (2013: 235), in relation to this, 
recommends “the appointment and the remuneration of the SB [Shari’ah Board] members 
should be done by another body like central bank or government to ensure the independence 
of the SB which is crucial for credibility”. The reinforcement of the independence of the 
SSB’s role would reduce the conflict of interest concerns, enhance creditability of the 
Shari’ah compliance process and increase investors’ confidence in the IFI. 
The discussion on the relevant literature on Shari’ah governance matters shows that a 
vital component of Shari’ah governance systems is the SSB (Grass, 2013: 334). The 
investors rely on the effective role and monitoring of the SSB since they are expected to have 
access to internal information similar to that of the IFI’s management (AlJifri & Khanselwal, 
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2013). Hence, SSBs’ decisions are only as good as the information that they are provided 
with. Therefore, for an effective implementation of the above process (shown in Figure 1) 
and for the efficient functioning of the SSB, establishment of an effective Shari’ah 
supervisory set-up is required within the IFI. The proper selection of products being in 
compliance with the Shari’ah, the proper use by the IFI of the funds collected and invested in 
accordance with the IFI-investor agreement
10
, and the maintenance of Shari’ah compliance 
throughout the term of agreement are paramount to the IFI maintaining its creditability. In 
carrying out its obligations, the SSB needs a “clear framework and structure to ensure its 
independence and effectiveness” (Malkawi, 2013:544). Framework and structure 
(appointment, composition, procedures, qualifications, audit and Shari’ah report) form 
essential elements in the Shari’ah governance process (Malkawi, 2013:552).  
Most studies in the past in relation to the Shari’ah governance system have been either 
theoretical or based on secondary data (Ahmed, 2011, Grais & Pellegrinni, 2006; Rammal, 
2006; Suleiman, 2000; Alman, 2012; Grass, 2013; Malkawi, 2013; Injas et al., 2016). 
Theoretical studies examine the role of Shari’ah governance in the framework of overall 
corporate governance (Chapra and Ahmed 2002; Hasan, 2009; Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2004) and 
compare the Shari’ah governance system with the conventional system (Abu-Tapanjeh, 2009; 
Saif Alnasser & Muhammed, 2012). Other studies cover SSBs and their role in the 
governance of IFIs (Garas & Pierce, 2010, Grais and Pelligrini 2006), Shari’ah audit 
(Lahsasna, Ibrahim & Othman, n.d.) and audit and Shari’ah control (Shaii & Salleh, 2010).  
There are a few studies that report information on Shari’ah Scholars/SSBs based on 
primary data collected from interviews with Shari’ah scholars that were not only SSB 
members but Shari’ah scholars involved in the IFI. Ullah, Harwood and Jamali (2016) report 
issues relating to fatwa rather than the Shari’ah governance system. Other primary data 
studies examine the SSB performance via seeking feedback/input from the Board of Directors 
and SSB members using survey questionnaires (scaling and multi-choice questions) on SSB 
performance (Nathan, 2010). A more recent study based on primary data collected from the 
SSB members, mostly from Malaysia, deals with some of the contemporary Shari’ah 
governance issues (Hasan, 2014).   
3. DATA AND RESEARCH METHODS 
                                                          
10 AAOIFI Governance Standard (4.9).  
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The research aims to examine the Shari’ah operations/governance set-up of IFIs across 
the GCC from the perspectives of Shari’ah scholars. As an exploratory approach, it gathered 
information from face-to-face semi-structured interviews with 13 Shari’ah Scholars (ShSc)11 
who are members of Shari’ah Supervisory Boards of Islamic financial institutions (IFI) from 
across the GCC. The interviews were based on a set of questions prepared beforehand, as 
guidance to providing a consistent framework. The interviews were conducted over a four 
month period (December 2015 - March 2016). All scholars were comfortable with taking the 
interview and with the recording. The interviews were conducted in Arabic as the scholars 
were from the GCC and preferred to converse in Arabic. Below is a summary of the profile of 
the interviewed ShScs.  
Table 1- Shari’ah Scholar’s Profile 
Shari’ah 
Scholar 
Location 
Number of Shari’ah 
Supervisory Board (SSB) 
Academia/ 
Independent 
ShSc-01 Bahrain 10+ Independent 
ShSc-02 Kuwait 5-10 Academia 
ShSc-03 Kuwait 5-10 * Independent 
ShSc-04 Kuwait 5-10 * Academia 
ShSc-05 Kuwait 5-10 Banks** Academia  
ShSc-06 UAE Less than 5 Banks** Academia 
ShSc-07 Bahrain 5 Locally Independent  
ShSc-08 Bahrain 5 Independent 
ShSc-09 Bahrain 5-10 Independent 
ShSc-10 Saudi Arabia 10+ Academia 
ShSc-11 Qatar 5-10 Independent 
ShSc-12 Kuwait 10 + Independent 
ShSc-13 Qatar 5-10 Independent 
*On SSB of the main IFI and its overseas branches and companies the IFI owns 100%. 
**Reference is to being a member on SSBs of banks, they could also be members of SSBs in other sectors. 
 
The responses were analysed using a content and thematic analysis (DeHoyos & Barnes, 
2011; Rayan & Russell, 2003 and Schreier, 2012). Initially the responses were transcribed 
and translated into English after which the content analysis was carried out manually. The 
responses are reported in a summarized form and are supported by relevant quotations from 
the scholars. 
 
4.  FINDINGS & ANALYSES 
                                                          
11 In presenting the results, the ShSc interviewed will be represented in code form (ShSc-01, ShSc-02, etc.) to preserve the 
confidentiality and the identity of the ShSc. While the Shari’ah scholars cannot be identified due to confidentiality, their 
basic characteristics are given in Table 1.   
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In analysing the responses of the ShScs, the general themes are first examined. These 
themes are then further elaborated by focusing on the subthemes.  
4.1.Terms of Reference 
The SSB is bound by its terms of reference that engages its members with the IFI. Hence, 
having clear terms of reference (TOR) and proper working procedures in place is the core to 
the relationship between the SSB and the IFI. This section examines the ShScs’ contractual 
agreement, appointment, responsibilities and working procedures and the responses received 
on those matters. 
Contractual Agreement 
Questions on contractual agreement included whether the ShScs had signed an 
agreement upon being appointed as a member of the IFI’s SSB, the details of their 
appointment clearly stated in writing, and whether other than the agreement their roles were 
defined by the internal procedures document of the IFI. 
As not all jurisdictions in the GCC region require a contractual agreement between the 
SSB members and the IFI itself, not all scholars had a contractual agreement with the IFIs 
where he was a member of the SSB.  Three scholars, constituting 23.08% of the sample, were 
on SSBs across different jurisdictions and indicated that they could have signed with an IFI in 
one jurisdiction and not in another. It appears that the reason behind not signing an agreement 
goes back to the initial concept on which the Shari’ah supervisory board was appointed. 
Initially, their role was considered as providing a voluntary service. However, with time, the 
work that the SSB performed, or was expected to perform, developed as the industry grew, 
and their role/function could no longer be considered as a voluntary service.  The 
specialization required to perform the role of SSBs developed into a profession.  As clarified 
by ShSc-05: 
“Initially when Shaikh X first established the Shari’ah supervisory board in [Jurisdiction] 
he had the concept that this duty should be performed voluntarily. And so, we did not 
need a contractual agreement between the Shari’ah supervisory board and the 
institution…And that is why here in [Jurisdiction] the Shari’ah supervisory board are 
assigned and the board of directors decides on their terms. Even we do not know how 
much we take, because it is not determined [the remuneration is considered as a gift]. I 
don’t think it is right, because the Shari’ah supervisory board role is no longer a fatwa 
process or a calculation process; it is a specialization, a profession…”.  
10 
 
Three scholars (23.08%) in the sample had detailed contracts signed with the IFI. ShSc-
06 noted contracts stated “what are your powers, your responsibilities from a confidentially 
aspect, from the aspect of the things you undertake”. A number of scholars (15.38%) who 
had signed agreements stated that the details of their responsibilities and obligations were not 
in the agreement but in the internal procedures.  ShSc-10 confirmed this: 
“For every Shari’ah supervisory board there are procedures. And the procedures display 
the member’s responsibilities, the committee’s12 responsibilities, the bank’s obligations 
and all the matters related to the Shari’ah supervisory board’s work, … in all the 
institutions without exception … the level of details varies from one institution to 
another, but the main issues, like number of meetings, the decision process, these are in 
all of them.”  
In some institutions, the agreements covered the SSB’s mandates, roles and 
responsibilities in detail while in others this was not the case. The former were in countries 
where regulators had specified (and in some a specimen was provided) and enforced such a 
requirement. In countries where such a requirement was not part of the regulatory 
requirement, the terms of reference were usually only outlined in the agreement. As 
explained by ShSc-12: 
“The level of detail varies. In some banks that are under the supervision of central banks 
there is a certain level of detail since the central bank places upon them a specimen of the 
agreement that is very detailed. In other cases, agreements only summarise the main 
duties…while these are adequate, they are not in such detail as those in countries where 
central banks enforce the specimen contracts”.   
In jurisdictions where the regulators have set guidelines for the SSB, the procedures are 
set by the SSB as per the regulatory requirements. ShSc-03 notes “in [Jurisdiction] ... it is left 
to the parties involved... we perform our role as per what is stated by the central bank, and as 
per the duties endorsed by the SSB itself as procedures and we perform accordingly. We 
prepare it [working procedures], but we have to have it endorsed by the central bank…”. In 
jurisdictions where the SSB’s terms of reference (TOR) are not clear, the SSBs have tried to 
overcome this by having internal procedures. ShSc-05 notes, “In [Jurisdiction] the practice is 
still vague…and as such we do not have agreements. The SSB has prepared internal 
procedures where it identifies the role and responsibilities of the SSB and the related parties. 
                                                          
12 Reference is to the executive committee that is a subset of the SSB. For more details, see section 4.3.1 under SSB’s 
Members Performance-Function. 
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The board of directors has endorsed these procedures and accordingly, they have been 
adopted.  This at least compensates for this deficiency”.  However, not all procedures were 
detailed as confirmed by ShSc-11: “there are banks that have procedures that are of one page 
and those that are of 10 pages”. 
Shari’ah scholars prefer to have some form of obligations so that everything is clear 
among the parties. They prefer to see the guidelines in the regulations that are made 
obligatory. ShSch-04 asserted “today there are no agreements. In some institutions 
agreements used to take place at the request of the Shari’ah Board. We feel there is a need for 
a law…this is supposed to be the work of the central bank. It is supposed to determine the 
duties and responsibilities of the Shari’ah board and enforce them on the institution.”. 
Though the preference is to have such a requirement in the regulation, it appears that it is 
not always followed where such regulation exists. Two Shari’ah scholars (15.38%) did not 
have internal procedures and did not sign a contractual agreement with the IFI even though it 
is a requirement. The reason cited by one of the Shari’ah Scholars was that since the details 
(the SSB’s roles and responsibilities) are in the regulations which are more than sufficient, 
there is no need to have a signed agreement. The understanding is that the regulation’s (the 
Law’s) power and status of enforcement is higher than a contractual agreement, as ShSc-13 
explains:  
“We have an Ameeri Law issued by his highness the Ameer with regards to organizing 
the Shari’ah boards and their powers and there are instructions issued by the [Regulator] 
on the duties of Shari’ah boards… We don’t have an agreement. It is assumed that we 
have agreements, but we have instructions [i.e., regulations] and the system [being the 
law] which are stronger than the agreement. There are no internal procedures at the IFI. 
We have endorsed resolutions from one of the forums that had taken place with regards 
to the fatwa procedures and how they are conducted.”13 
Appointment 
Appointment in general gives an indication of the line of reporting, or, in reality, who has 
the influence in those reports and to whom one is accountable to. Overall, as part of the 
SSB’s function in the organization chart, its line of reporting is to the general assembly, the 
                                                          
13 The following are the headings in the two-page procedure that was provided to the researcher: The adaptation of contract 
(relationship between SSB and the SSB and the Fatwa process); Rules on IFI asking for another opinion from other SSB; 
Controls in prohibiting of financial fatwas; Controls of consenting and permitting in financial fatwas. 
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shareholders, and the owners of the IFI.  In order for the SSB to obtain and maintain 
independence, the SSB insists on certain matters, as ShSc-02 notes:  
“We always place a condition on the IFI that the SSB is appointed by the general 
assembly, and not the board of directors. Secondly, we make ensure that the 
organizational chart shows us as an independent party from the executive management 
and that we don’t follow the executive management. Thirdly, we insist that there is a 
permanent Shari’ah supervision department. That it has employees, and submits its 
reports to the SSB and informs the executive management”  
The SSB is appointed at the Annual General Assembly (AGM) by the shareholders of the 
IFI. While in some jurisdictions the SSB member is appointed by name by the general 
assembly, in other jurisdictions the board of directors (BOD) selects him after having been 
given the authorization to do so by the general assembly. Two Shari’ah scholars (15.38%) 
indicate that in some cases the shareholders do not always appoint them by name but leave it 
to the IFI’s senior management to select the members of the SSB. As ShSc-05 explains: “here 
in [Jurisdiction], the Shari’ah supervisory board is assigned by the AGM and the board of 
directors are authorized to decide and hire them.” However, in most cases (6 ShScs - 
46.15%), the SSB is appointed by the general assembly by name, and “After the names are 
approved by the general assembly, the board of directors are delegated to contract them, so 
we sign [the contract] with the board of directors” (ShSc-05).  
Although the appointment of the SSB is at the general assembly, the selection process is 
not completely independent. The shareholders base their selection on the nomination 
provided by the BODs, and this matter is a cause of concern with some of the SSB members. 
They are concerned that, at times, this process of the nomination of a scholar depends on how 
cooperative he is with the IFI and in approving their products, as expressed by ShSc-06:   
“For independence purposes, we are supposed to follow the general assembly… but, 
what is currently happening, unfortunately, is that the board of directors are nominating. 
No doubt because most of the shareholders don’t know the scholars. So they [BOD] 
recommend and nominate and in the event of any dispute, it goes back to the general 
assembly to decide. But in some places this is not the case, and it is the BOD that is 
making the decisions [selecting the SSB members]…of course this is not right. Because 
you cannot have independence, when you feel you are threatened at any moment, if you 
did not approve this product, it means ma’salama [farewell]”.  
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Even though the mechanism is better than it used to be (the appointment was previously 
made by the BOD and now it is made by the general assembly), there is still room for 
improvement. Since in most of cases the shareholders rely on the BOD and rarely question 
their decisions, the aspiration of the scholars is to get the regulator to intervene more so that 
the threat to independence is reduced. One scholar explains the reason for this is that it is 
human nature that certain things affect them unconsciously, even if they do not admit it. 
Specifically, ShSc-07 states that it is important  
“…to make sure that no member is dismissed without providing a comprehensive and 
clear statement and obtaining the approval of the central bank and not by just giving him 
a notice. I don’t think these things have been treated in a satisfactory manner. Leaving it 
to every member and his conscience [in that his Shari’ah decisions are not affected by 
the concern of being re-appointed]. And even though many members say that these 
things do not affect their independence … we are kidding ourselves.”  
The hope is to get the regulators to intervene, as expressed by ShSc-04: “in my opinion the 
central bank needs to have a role. Any Shari’ah member whose contract does not get renewed 
needs to attend the general assembly and talk in front of the shareholders”. In some 
jurisdictions, however, the approval of the regulator is a must as indicated by ShSch-13 
“appointment is through the General Meeting of each bank and the final approval of [the 
Regulator] is a must.” 
4.2. Mandates and Responsibilities 
For the effective performance of the SSB, its mandates and responsibilities need to be 
clear and understood. The following section looks into the ShScs understanding of their 
mandates and responsibilities as members of the IFI’s SSB. 
In general, the main understanding of the SSB mandate is to give its Shari’ah opinion 
(i.e., fatwa). In addition, there is an overall understanding to the requirement of follow-up on 
the proper implementation of the fatwa. Despite this, the Shari’ah scholars’ views differ on 
whether the follow-up is to be performed directly or indirectly by the SSB. Specifically, there 
are differences of opinions on whether the SSB should conduct the follow-up itself or assign 
it to the Shari’ah department of the IFI with the SSB performing supervision through the 
reports that the Shari’ah department produces. 
The overall understanding from among the scholars is that the role of the SSB is to 
provide its Shari’ah opinion and fatwa and to supervise its implementation (12 ShScs-
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92.31%). Their role is to respond to inquiries/questions and provide their Shari’ah opinion on 
products/investments presented to them. In addition to the issuance of a Fatwa, there is a 
need to ensure that the Shari’ah department performs its role in the implementation. The 
Shari’ah department’s role is to pass the fatwa on to the related department and to follow-up 
on the proper execution of the fatwa by performing an audit. As elaborated by ShSc-03: 
“We are divided into two divisions: the first is fatwa or what we call the decisions made, 
and the second is supervision. The fatwa relates to decisions on questions and 
agreements… and supervision is most of the time executed by appointing supervisors 
[within the Shari’ah department]. We supervise those supervisors... so it’s two parallel 
tasks. Making the decision and the following up on the implementation and the 
soundness of the decision both take place at the same time…”  
Whether the SSB is appointed directly or indirectly by the general assembly, it produces 
a report as part of the IFI’s Shari’ah compliance which is presented to the shareholders at the 
annual general assembly. As indicated by ShSC-08, “usually the SSB submits it [the SSB 
report] to the general assembly through the board of directors.” The Shari’ah department 
usually generates regular reports to the SSB on the extent of compliance of the IFI, as noted 
by ShSc-10 “the Shari’ah board…look at the reports either quarterly, semi-annually and 
annually on the activities of the institution and its compliance with Shari’ah board’s 
decisions.” Furthermore, the SSB reviews these reports for any violations or shortcomings in 
compliance, which it then discusses with the Shari’ah department. ShSc-02 notes “we review 
these reports and if there is any shortfalls we call upon the department to discuss such 
shortfalls…”  
Even though in some instances the title of the SSB indicates that supervision is to be 
undertaken by the SSB member directly, the SSB does not do so themselves and the practice 
is to give this role to the audit department. This was acknowledged by ShSc-13: “…in actual 
fact the board should perform the role of fatwa and the role of supervision, meaning audit. 
But from long ago there has always been a Shari’ah audit set-up at the IFI that performs this 
[audit] role and raises its observations to the Shari’ah board.”  
It appears that the weight of following up on the implementation of the SSB’s decisions 
falls heavily on the internal Shari’ah department of the IFI. This is due to the fact that not all 
the members of the SSB are available full time and that the Shari’ah department is in contact 
on a regular daily basis with the IFI. Such a responsibility makes it important that the 
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Shari’ah department is independent from the influence of the IFI’s senior management and 
employees. ShSc-06 confirms the importance of independence and explains the current set-up 
of the Shari’ah department as follows: 
“…it is expected in every financial institution that there is a supervision department and 
internal Shari’ah department. This internal Shari’ah supervisor [member of the Shari’ah 
department] technically follows the Shari’ah board, but administratively is under the 
board of directors. The supervisor is the eye of the Shari’ah board and for this he needs 
to be independent. The board of directors has no right to dismiss him without the 
Shari’ah board’s approval and justification”.  
However, since the internal audit function itself is not independent from the IFI, some 
scholars consider the Shari’ah department’s supervisors/officers to also be falling 
administratively under the IFI management which affects their independence and therefore 
their performance. The IFI’s management controls the appointment and salaries of those 
officers/supervisors, and, as such, this has an effect on the employees. Since such matters are 
under the IFI’s control, the employees of the Shari’ah department might be influenced to try 
and keep on IFI management’s good side, which could jeopardize the quality of the 
compliance/audit reports being generated. Therefore, the matter of independence remains a 
concern as expressed by ShSc-04: 
“I consider it problematic that for the supervision to be in a strong position, 
administratively it should follow the board [the SSB]. This is my opinion. But, 
unfortunately, till today this does not exist in Islamic banks overall. If you do not provide 
them with the sense of security, whether he is the member or a supervisor, how is he 
going to perform his role?”  
While in most cases the scholars viewed their role in audit as being similar to supervision, 
one of the scholars stated otherwise. ShSc-12 claimed that the SBB performs both roles: “The 
Shari’ah board member in all the boards performs fatwa and Shari’ah audit. A Shari’ah audit 
that he submits to the general assembly. Which as per the terminology is known as external 
Shari’ah audit…we in the Shari’ah board that we have, the level of control in it, is high... 
Meaning the Shari’ah board audits all the authorized transactions to arrive at the information 
and provide its final decision on the extent of compliance to the general assembly. The 
Shari’ah board’s report is directed to the shareholders.” Being a Shari’ah firm they were able 
to perform both roles (fatwa and audit) and had the adequate staff to perform both roles, 
reducing reliance on the IFI’s internal Shari’ah department and enhancing independence.  
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ShSc-12 elaborated: “we as a Shari’ah board are a part of an advisory firm, we offer the 
service. As such this weak point [the SSB reliance on the internal Shari’ah audit performed 
internally] does not exist.” 
4.3. SSB Member’s Performance and Independence 
The skills and tools that the SSB members are required to perform and function 
efficiently and effectively are examined in this section. In addition, the independence of the 
members and the SSB, which is an essential feature that cannot be compromised in order to 
maintain the credibility of the SSB’s decisions and performance, is also presented.  
4.3.1. SSB Member’s Performance-Function  
Shari’ah scholars try to perform their duties and responsibilities as efficiently as they can, 
since it affects their reputation. Their outcomes and decisions are usually based on the 
information provided and the documents presented to them by the IFI and its employees. 
However, there are times when decisions that were made were not as proficient as they ought 
to be as adequate information was not provided at the time. This was, confirmed by ShSc-06: 
“Employees sometimes do not provide you with a true picture of the matter, so you decide on 
something differently to what is its true image. You provide your opinion on the information 
provided and image of the thing. Then after that, you discover that the matter was not like 
that. Now you can withdraw. You can eliminate or you can object on the structure.” There are 
also times when employees of IFIs take up the initiative of introducing new products prior to 
obtaining the SSB’s approval, thinking that it is similar to a product already introduced, as 
ShSc-06 continues to explain: 
“Sometimes some employees conjecture and offer a product [without SSB approval], 
thinking that there is nothing wrong from a conceptual point of view. But there could be 
one condition that damages everything and he offers it and then the Shari’ah board hears 
that there is a product that was launched. Or after offering it they put it forward to the 
SSB. He [the IFI’s employee] is at fault. Now, either the IFI stops it or amends it, if it is 
possible to amend, and reprimands the employee…” 
In order to be able to perform one’s duties, Shari’ah scholars indicate that certain 
administrative skills are required along with having procedural systems in place. Five 
scholars (38.46%) were able to carry out their duties and responsibilities by proper time 
management and some of them through regular weekly meetings. In addition, some request 
that they be provided with the documents for review ahead of time to prepare, as put forward 
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by ShSc-07: “I have to do whatever I can to meet the responsibilities appointed to me. So if 
there is a set meeting and there are agreements to be discussed in the meeting, I make sure 
that they send the agreements within adequate time, not two days before the meeting or at the 
Shari’ah board meeting itself, so it’s just a quick read. This doesn’t work.”  
Moreover, technology has contributed to the time management as it has facilitated 
communication and coordinating for a smoother performance. ShSC-05 states that “time 
management and the modern means of communication have now smoothened things. Instead 
of, for example, having to travel back and forth every week, they send you the agreements 
through e-mails and you review it and send it back. The modern communication has reduced 
the load of work.” 
In addition to handling their time efficiently, three scholars (23.08%) considered 
experience and knowledge to contribute greatly to their ability to perform. Due to experience, 
they are able to identify the weak areas and concentrate on them during the review of the 
document. To this, ShSc-02 claims: “When one has spent a long time in this area, he knows 
the areas of weaknesses in the agreements, where are the areas that need focusing on…we 
concentrate on the origins of the agreement, on what it is built on, the price, the underlying 
asset, the conditions required. Hence, even reading the agreement is reduced due to 
experience...”  
Shari’ah scholars have also benefited from being members of several SSBs, whereby 
similar matters/products are sometimes discussed, and, by reviewing and commenting on one 
SSB, the work is also done towards their input in other SSBs. Moreover, scholars have also 
started to share work with newly established IFIs. Some documents that are common in IFIs 
which they have reviewed and have a standardized format are shared with the newly 
established IFI. To this ShSc-02 confirms:  
“After a period of close to 45 years, many agreements have become normal, and new 
agreements are few. I wouldn’t say rare, but have become less. For example, after a bank 
is established, we bring them our agreements. We have read and approved them; we give 
it to them. How much effort have we saved them? And we do not have to review them. 
The bank discusses with us any changes it makes on them and not the whole agreement. 
This without doubt reduced a lot of time for us.” 
With time, some scholars have gained profound understanding and experience that has 
led to not only providing an opinion but also helped them to resolve matters. ShSc-04 says: 
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“The experience broadens the perspectives a lot on how to handle matters and ways to deal 
with it. If you face a problem, you have to think how you are going to resolve it. Meaning I 
do not stop at the problem and that’s it, I think how I can resolve it.” 
Some scholars, even with proper time management and experience cannot see 
themselves as being able to handle being on too many SSBs. As such, they have limited their 
Shari’ah board memberships, as noted by ShSc-11: “Before I was on many Shari’ah boards, 
but now I have limited it to less than 10.” Similarly, ShSc-06 adds “sometimes some people, 
without doubt, they have over 200 [SBB membership], they are to be asked about, how do 
they cope? Maybe by virtue of their long years of experience, the matter has become 
easy…But I do not see this capability in me”. Meanwhile other scholars view it differently 
and handle the matter of being on many boards as professionals. The IFI, prior to appointing 
them, is aware of their multiple Shari’ah board seats and they are bound by the 
confidentiality agreement that they sign with the IFI. Furthermore, the SSB’s responsibility is 
not a promotional one but rather is limited to Shari’ah products and their compliance, as 
ShSc-07 explains:  
“I don’t think there is a problem [with being a member on several boards]. You have the 
legal institutions providing advice, financial audit institutions performing audit and they 
provide these services to more than one institution. The Shari’ah board’s role has 
nothing to do with marketing and promoting. The Shari’ah board’s responsibility is 
limited to the extent of the product and the working environment as whole being 
Shari’ah compliant or not, our work is only within this framework.”  
However, ShSc-07 also notes that although the role the SSB member performs is a 
professional one (meaning a member can be on the SBB of several competing IFIs), in order 
to do it professionally and efficiently he would need to be solely dedicated to this role. He 
asserts “No doubt if a Shari’ah board member has a job commitment, meaning for example 
he teaches at the university and even if it is only one or two subjects in a term. And at the 
same time he is a member in let us say 60 Shari’ah boards, off course it affects [his 
performance-function adversely].”  
Four scholars (30.77%) indicate that they performed their duties and responsibilities as 
per the agreed upon working procedures. The issues included in the procedures include how 
matters are handled, how the review process is undertaken, how inquiries are put forward, 
and how they are dealt with and so forth, with all those involved performing their expected 
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role. The SSB tries to be involved right from the beginning of the process, as ShSc-13 
comments: “it is necessary that all the transactions are presented to us from the beginning; 
from when they first start working on it till it ends. All of it, we are with them step by step, 
until we place the controls and the standards and we look at it from a Shari’ah perspective 
only. This is before the execution of the transaction and after the execution we also audit the 
transaction [through supervising the audit process].”  
In order to be able to implement the working procedures, four scholars (30.77%) indicate 
that SSBs have created an executive committee from within its members that deal with urgent 
matters, undertake further research when needed for any inquiry or product/investment, 
review documents, and coordinate with the IFI’s internal Shari’ah department. In dealing 
with urgent matters ShSc-02 explains: 
“We have set up an executive committee which, in reality, deals with the urgent, quick 
matters that the bank wants to make quick decisions on. …and so there are no delays on 
their investment decisions. The executive committee most of the time looks into the 
urgent matters and gives the opinion. After that, at the earliest Shari’ah board meeting, it 
puts forward its decision, the executive committee’s decision to the Shari’ah board for 
endorsement or amendment or to see what they say.”  
Five scholars (38.46%) opined that once the SSB makes a decision on an 
agreement/contract, it is taken as a standard which the Shari’ah department uses as default 
when reviewing the agreements that are submitted for the SSB’s approval. Agreements that 
are submitted to the Shari’ah department that are similar to previously submitted agreements 
are reviewed by the Shari’ah department and only the changes/differences are put forward to 
the SSB for their input. The Shari’ah department follows the same concept on all 
matters/transactions that the IFI considers entering into and puts forward for a Shari’ah 
opinion, as ShSc-01 explains:  
“When an institution is considering entering into a project, it from the start gets the 
Shari’ah department involved, at the least. The Shari’ah department sees if there are 
fatwa/Shari’ah decisions around the subject, if it has been reviewed before or not. So if it 
is something new, then it has to be presented to the SSB.”  
Such a process has reduced the load on the SSB as admitted by ShSc-02: “this has simplified 
a lot of things… through Shari’ah supervision department, we check that it has not been 
changed; in that all the agreements that the Shari’ah board has approved are the ones that are 
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being used.” Similarly, the same concept applies to supervising Shari’ah audit. Those 
performing the audit have a checklist upon which they base their review of the compliance of 
a product/investment. 
4.3.2. SSB Member’s Independence 
This section looks into the independence of the Shari’ah scholars and how they try to 
maintain their independence, so as to not affect their performance and hence decisions. 
The ability to main independence as per IFSB-10 (2009, 15) is “when none of its 
members has a blood or intimate relationship with the IIFS, its related companies or its 
officers that could interfere, or be reasonably perceived to interfere, with the exercise of 
independent judgement in the best of the IIFS by the Shari’ah Board”. Two scholars (15.38%) 
linked independence to the ability to perform their role without transferring information from 
one IFI to another. They looked at it by their ability to maintain confidentiality and compared 
it to other professions that deal with several competing organizations at the same time, as 
commented by ShSc-01: “Auditors provide services to several establishments and consultants 
provide services to several establishments. They all sign to maintain confidentiality.”  
Even though many see that maintaining independence is not easy when the Shari’ah 
scholar is in multiple boards, not all see it as a concern and treat it as any other profession, as 
ShSc-09 explains: “There is no conflict, because I am only an independent member. My 
situation is like any external advisory company...like E&Y auditing several banks. This does 
not affect that it audits this bank and this bank. The same thing with the scholar… this does 
not intervene with his work, never.”  
A number of scholars (15.38%) think that they attain their independence by not being 
associated with or being disconnected from the IFI in some form or another, physically and 
mentally. ShSc-12 explains this: “Independence has to be real. That the scholar is not an 
employee of the institution. He has not received any financial facility. Not a significant 
shareholder or a board member or so and so.” Moreover, he goes on to emphasise the 
importance of physical disassociation to the extent of personal relationships and dealings: 
“also in his practice, the scholar has to also be independent, to be mentally independent. 
Meaning that he does not fall under, or place himself in position that tarnishes his 
independence; like personal relationships, through financial relationships and so forth.”  
The question on principle of association was included whether the scholar was on the 
BOD or part of the management, or if he was a client of the IFI or had ownership in the IFI. 
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Figure 2 presents the level of the interviewed Shari’ah scholars association with the IFI in 
which they were on the SSB. 
 Figure 2-Shari'ah Scholar's Association with the IFI 
 
 
From the responses, it appears that with exception of one scholar
14
 they (92.31% - 12 of 
them) are not part of the BODs nor its management. To not be on the BOD or management 
was taken as standard rule and was the understanding of almost all scholars. Two scholars 
who owned shares in the IFI indicated that their ownership was not significant (less than 5%). 
One of the scholar mentioned that even though it is not a significant percentage, he abides by 
the insider rules of reporting such ownership. Meanwhile, another stated that he has, as a rule, 
taken care to not own shares in the IFI in which he is an SSB member. According to him, the 
idea of ownership (less than 5%) creates a conflict of interest that is not seen in such a way 
by all. According to ShSc-05, there are two views on this: “One that does not consider 
owning shares (a non-controlling interest) in the IFI as a conflict of interest and the other that 
considers owning shares (a non-controlling interest) in IFI as a conflict of interest.” The 
majority of the scholars (10 or 76.92%) were clients of the IFI since they needed to have 
accounts with IFI, especially since they were preaching Islamic banking. However, in 
addition to having an account, some scholars also used financial facilities from the IFI. Some 
scholars used financial services from the same IFI in which they were an SSB member and in 
such cases disclosed it. Others made the effort to take financial facilities from an IFI that they 
were not associated with. 
Having another job and not depending on the remuneration received from the IFI as a 
source of income provides the scholar with the ability to leave, in the event he thinks it is 
affecting his performance (2 ShScs - 15.38%). As ShSc-05 explains: “first thing I am not an 
                                                          
14 He is head of Internal Shari'ah Supervision and a member of SSB of the same IFI. He is also a member on other IFI’s 
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employee at the bank. And if I felt that there was any pressure, I would resign. Since I am a 
lecturer at the university, I do not have a problem. The one who has a problem is who is an 
employee. Not being an employee of the bank gives him strength with regards to being 
independent Shari’ah board member, in my opinion. No one can impose their opinion on 
you”.  
One scholar indicated that scholars draw their independence from the regulations. ShSc-
13 confirms this by saying, “I do not have any connection with them [the financial 
institutions]. We have our full independence, backed by the Law and the central bank’s 
instructions”. 
For a number of scholars (15.38%), it is a matter of trying to maintain reputation, “the 
scholar, like the institution has his reputation. He quickly loses his reputation if he falls into 
such a problem [not able to resist pressure]. The strength of the member and its importance 
and its status is derived from many things, the most important of which is independence” 
(ShSc-10). Furthermore, ShSc-03 asserts that to perform one’s duties and responsibilities 
effectively is a matter of being able to handle the duties that have been assigned as per the 
role to be performed. He states, “if one can handle the assigned duties he accepts, if he can’t 
[handle what is being assigned due to added pressure], he decides, accordingly if he accepts 
or not. Because in return his contract will not be renewed. For it is an annual relationship. 
The general assembly has the right not to renew”. 
With others, maintaining independence is a matter of conscience, as ShSc-04 notes: 
“This means questioning, what we call self-censorship. A responsibility in front of Allah 
before the people.” On this note, ShSc-07 comments that conscience is not sufficient to 
maintain independence, especially if performance is linked to remuneration and renewal with 
the IFI. He considers that this can only be controlled by an independent and authoritative 
third party. He states, “This third party can only be the governmental, central authority. To 
make sure that the Shari’ah board performs its duties with adequate freedom … to make sure 
a member is not disposed of without a clear comprehensive statement and approval of the 
central bank, and not only by notification” (ShSc-07). 
In addition to the observation of ShSc-07 concerning independence, attention to the 
number of terms a scholar can be reappointed needs to be looked into. Other than what was 
discussed above concerning the member’s selection and appointment, the Shari’ah scholar’s 
term is open, both with regards to the number of terms he can serve along with the length of 
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his terms, as indicated by ShSc-03, “for us it is open, there is no limit imposed…” (ShSc-03). 
With no regulatory cap, the number of terms that a scholar can be re-appointed is open which 
can affect the scholar’s independence by being associated with an IFI for too long. 
4.4. Shari’ah Compliance and Shari’ah Risk 
As seen under the Mandates and Responsibilities section above, the internal Shari’ah 
audit/review is performed mainly by the internal Shari’ah department of the IFI. All 
departments within the IFI undergo audit, and, depending on the importance of the 
department audit, can be undertaken more than once a year. Usually, the Shari’ah audit plan 
is reviewed earlier in the year with the SSB and, once agreed upon by the Shari’ah auditors, 
the executed transactions are checked to ensure their implementation as per the SSB’s 
decisions.  
4.4.1. Shari’ah Compliance Reporting 
Shari’ah compliance is maintained through performing Shari’ah audit. However, the 
results of the review/audit that are undertaken do not necessarily get reported in the annual 
report that is presented to the shareholders at the general assembly. It appears that it is not 
always the case that the details of the outcome of the Shari’ah audit are reported. Although 
correction of Shari’ah non-compliance matters are taken up, the disclosure of it depends 
mainly on the SSB’s policy on disclosure. 
 
Two Shari’ah scholars (15.38%) indicate that when non-compliance matters arise during 
the review, it is looked at from the aspect of whether it was an intentional mistake or not. If 
the IFI’s policy is not to violate the Shari’ah principles and the errors that occurred were 
related to an employee’s lack of understanding and improper procedures, it is usually 
rectified and not disclosed in the annual Shari’ah report. Any violations/non-compliance are 
reviewed and are appraised to certain criteria or colour coding schemes to decide whether 
they are reported in the annual report or not. As ShSc-04 explains: “the level of error [as per 
the financial institution’s criteria] affects my appraisal. A mistake is classified as a big 
mistake, medium mistake, no mistake. So if the mistake is big and the bank has generated 
profits, we purify it... It is mentioned [in the annual report] especially when the mistake is 
big.” 
Another instance where the SSB does report to the general assembly is when the IFI is 
not listening to them and keeps repeating the mistake. As a form of indirect reprimand, the 
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mistake is disclosed as noted by ShSc-11: “If the management overdid the matter or repeated 
the error, it is written [in the report]. For example, this time [reference to the last report 
produced] …we found they repeated, so we put it in the report. So that the shareholders know 
and they faulted the management harshly.”  
However, three scholars (23.08%) mention that when the reporting takes place on 
significant matters, it is not always in detail, and, more often than not, it is in a general form. 
A term of ‘routine mistakes’ has been developed and used so as to give a general idea of 
compliance. ShSc-13 elaborates: “we derived this phrase: the Shari’ah board has reviewed 
the products, agreements and transactions and they were in accordance with the Shari’ah 
principles and rules, in whole. Why we say this. There is a difference in the language from 
when I say ‘in whole’ and ‘as a whole’. ‘As a whole’ means all the transactions are correct 
while ‘in whole’ means two to three four mistakes; that is normal in all institutions”. 
Such non-compliance details are not always reported to the regulator either, yet they are 
accessible to them if they want to view/inspect it. This is confirmed by ShSc-06, “We don’t 
report it to the central bank, but it is available in the minutes. The minutes are assumed 
confidential, but the central bank can look at what it wants. Sometimes they ask.” 
In most institutions, violations are internally documented based on the severity of the 
violation. Some rank them as high, medium and low while others colour code them (as 
mentioned above). There are no set ways of documenting non-compliance. In addition to the 
criteria of ranking, what is set is subjective and differs from one SSB/IFI to another. The way 
they are reported/documented and categorized varies from one institution to the other. There 
is no set standard (set specimen) of such a non-compliance report, similar to how it is with 
conventional audit, as ShSc-09 notes: 
“Everyone has his way [of classifying compliance and documenting the audit]. Unlike 
the external auditors who have procedures that they follow internationally, we as 
Shari’ah auditors have our own way. It can be developed, because we are still 
developing. So you will find one Shari’ah auditor has his way in writing it, I write my 
report in a different way, a third Shari’ah auditor might write it better than us.” 
There are times when the SSB does not see the value of reporting a non-compliance 
matter, especially if it does not have any financial effect. It depends on the SSB’s policy on 
disclosure and reporting as to whether these are reported or not. Three scholars (23.08%) 
indicate that reputation usually is a factor in the matter and at times reputational impact can 
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be greater than the financial impact. There are times when, as per Shari’ah principles, the 
violation is considered severe, yet its financial effect is much less and if reported would have 
a negative impact. In such instances, the SSB records it in the minutes of the meeting and 
follows-up with management so that it gets rectified and is not necessarily reported in the 
annual report. Sh.Sc-03 rationalizes: “it [the SSB] forced the executive committee to follow-
up and provide it with regular updates till it is informed that it has been internally rectified, 
instead of putting it forward in the report, because this could open doors of inquiries.” 
Furthermore, non-compliance matters that occur are usually only reported to the general 
assembly when it is a significant matter since it is an open public meeting and could cause a 
serious negative reputational effect on the IFI. ShSc-09 remarks: “You are now at the general 
assembly, meaning shareholders are sitting, the ministry of commerce is present, the central 
bank is present, auditors are present, the press is present; so the meeting is open. So it can’t 
be that I expose them unless it’s a major wrong doing.” 
4.4.2. Shari’ah Risk 
The Shari’ah scholars’ views on the main issues that they consider are related to 
Shari’ah matters and impose a risk on a transaction from being Shari’ah compliant are 
summarized in Figure 3.  
Figure 3-The Shari'ah Scholar's Opinion on the Shari'ah Principles 
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to deal only in halal items’ was the main principle. As ShSc-10 explains: “If a mistake 
occurred, for example that does not have an effect from the Shari’ah aspect of the halal 
haram, but it violates, for example, the decision taken by the Shari’ah board [in 
implementation], in such incident, we can’t say that it violated Shari’ah. But we can’t leave 
the matter be, we record it in the minutes that this and this was noticed… after which follow-
up and correction is taken.” Quite a few scholars considered other principles as a means to 
decide on the halal and haram principle. For example, disclosure and clarity of information, 
and elimination of gharar are needed to be able to have a full picture in order to determine 
whether it meets the halal principle, as ShSc-03 explains: “This is not important as much as it 
is a ‘means’. The most important thing is halal and haram. Transparency is a means to 
achieve them. How do I know the halal and haram without knowing the true facts? Deciding 
on a matter before being able to imagine it… the Shari’ah board is captive to the information 
that it is provided with.”  
Eleven scholars (85%) selected the principles of ‘prohibition of Riba and Gharar’ and eight 
(62%) of them viewed ‘Abiding by Shari’ah principles of clarity, and disclosing information, 
so as not to be manipulating’ as important. ShSc-07 explains, “the most important thing is 
that the IFI abides at a minimum, the red line, that can’t be forgiven with the issue of riba and 
gharar. The IFI in all cases must avoid riba and gharar in all its degree and forms. And then 
the other matters, depending on the strength of the institution and its size can be considered.” 
Nearly half of the scholars (7 or 54%) held transparent dealings to be a Shari’ah risk. One 
scholar thought clarity and the disclosing of information is a matter for the regulators and two 
respondents (15%) considered abiding by the principle ‘requirement for fair and transparent 
dealings to ensure all partners are aware of their rights and obligations’ to be a part of the 
regulator’s role. One of them considered it to be the IFI’s role.  
Nine of the 13 scholars (69%) identified ‘transaction have to be real and be certain and 
not based on uncertainty or speculation’ as a Shari’ah risk. Meanwhile, one of the scholars 
considered the matter of the transaction being real as a subjective matter depending on which 
school of thought is being looked at. Meanwhile, eight scholars (62%) thought that the 
principle of ‘No unjust enrichment, equity and fairness to all parties’ could also affect the 
Shari’ah. To this, ShSc-01 commented: “if we hold by the Islamic principle, then Shari’ah 
contracts has within it what assures this matter [referring to no unjust principle]. If you notice 
most of the Shari’ah principles are related to the lifting of gharar and jahalah between 
parties and transparency.” One of the scholars considered it as a part of the IFI’s role while 
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another thought that in principle justice is required and the term/phrase is too wide and hence 
too ambiguous to consider. 
With regards to the principle ‘the goal of the IFI is not limited to the maximization of 
shareholders’ wealth but also includes enhancement of the standard of living and welfare of 
the community’, six scholars (46%) mentioned that this is too wide a Shari’ah principle and 
too much to impose on the IFI; it should be taken care of by the government.  Only two 
scholars (15%) considered it a matter to look into, and one scholar thought it should be a part 
of corporate governance and social responsibility. 
Six scholars (46%) were of the view that the principle of profit and loss is a characteristic 
in all investments and others thought it is not a requirement for transactions to be Islamic. 
The sharing of loss and profit is only one of the several ways of transacting in a Shari’ah way 
(Musharakah, Mudarabah, Wakala). Furthermore, there was also the understanding that risk-
sharing is not Shari’ah related. The concept of risk sharing was not associated with the 
principle of profit and loss, and the Scholars were defensive. They asserted that losses 
incurred was not a Shari’ah issue and the SSB had nothing to do with it. ShSc-09 clarified 
this by saying, “Some people say you are the Shari’ah board and the bank lost because you 
the Shari’ah board closed on them in the transactions [in that the SSB’s Shari’ah decision 
placed restrictions on the investment/IFI) …I tell them I have no relationship, whether the 
bank made profits, the bank made losses, I’m not related…”. 
While bearing these in mind, the link between the IFI and the investor is the agreement 
that they sign and the content of the agreement determines the causes or effects of violation. 
In the Shari’ah, no agreement takes place without both parties being satisfied and consenting 
to the agreement. As such, whether any Shari’ah risk is incurred depends on the type of 
agreement that is signed and the conditions of the specific type of agreement. ShSc-10 
elaborates on this:  
“Agreements, are not valid if they [parties] aren’t satisfied… so being satisfied, is an 
important matter for the validation of agreements. And satisfaction is not achievable 
without knowledge; it is associated with knowledge...So providing information is 
something essential and holding it back is what spoils it. It is important to ensure what 
matters are in the text of the agreements …it [an incident/matter that occurred and is not 
meeting a clause in a contract or has been left out] is considered a deficiency, and is 
looked at … whether the contravention affects significantly its Shari’ah features, that it 
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transforms the agreement from a valid agreement to void agreement, or it is just a 
violation and no harm has been inflected on the others”. 
5. CONCLUSION AND RECOMENDATIONS 
 
This paper presented the findings of the interviews conducted with Shari’ah scholars who 
are members of SSBs of IFIs across the GCC. The paper explored in depth the organizational 
and work relationship of the SSB with its IFI, how the Shari’ah function is undertaken and 
what could jeopardize its quality. The findings present the scholars’ responses starting from 
being appointed, the performance of their duties as part of a team/board, and the decisions 
made pre- and post-investment/product launch. It also looked into Shari’ah compliance issues 
and how the Shari’ah audit function is performed. Scholars’ concerns about Shari’ah 
governance issues were also presented for it is an essential component to improve the SSB’s 
role and the Shari’ah supervisory function within an IFI. 
From the interviews, it appears that the operations of the Shari’ah supervision of the IFI 
can impose operational risk in the form of Shari’ah compliance risk that can affect the 
performance of the SSB function. There appears to be internal and external causes. Some of 
the internal causes, as seen from the findings of this paper, can occur due to the SSB having 
unclear roles and responsibilities. It can also be due to the lack of independence of both the 
SSB from the IFI (remuneration dependence) and those performing Shari’ah audit internally 
when administratively they fall under the IFI. Furthermore, issues arise in the approval of 
products (before, and in some cases, after it is launched), full transparency, and asymmetric 
information from the employees of the IFI. In addition, along with there being no set standard 
on the classification of Shari’ah compliance and compliance process documentation, the lack 
of transparency in the reporting of non-compliance affects accountability/responsibility.  
The external causes appear to be shortfalls in the laws and regulations of the Shari’ah 
supervision function. In addition to the fact that regulations vary from one jurisdiction to 
another, the matters mentioned above also need to be addressed. Issues such as 
independence/conflict of interest, Shari’ah audit, Shari’ah non-compliance reporting, 
standardization of the compliance process and classification are but a few issues that need to 
be regulated and effectively enforced. One way to improve the overall Shari’ah governance 
regimes at the national level is to introduce governance standards issued by IFSB and 
AAOIFI.   
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As the role of the SSB is an independent form of supervision, its independence is crucial. 
Although, the SSB’s appointment is approved by the shareholders, they are usually based on 
the recommendation of the IFI’s board of directors. Moreover, re-election of the Shari’ah 
scholars to SSBs is open. The longevity through the continuous re-appointment of the same 
SSB member, along with the IFI’s board/management’s continuous nomination, affects the 
true independence of the SSB and its work. As noted above, not all non-compliance matters 
are reported, especially if they are resolved prior to the date of the report. AAOIFI 
Governance Standards (5) also refer to this matter as a matter of concern and suggest rotating 
at least one SSB member every 5 years. Yet this was not mentioned by any interviewee 
implying that it does not appear to be observed even in jurisdictions where the AAOIFI 
standards are obligatory.
15
 Moreover, in some jurisdictions, recently a cap
16
 on the term a 
scholar can serve at an IFI has been introduced. Yet no mention of it was made in the 
interviews. Hence, it appears that enforcement of those adopting the AAOIFI standards or the 
recent requirements, in addition to regulations on the terms of reference and appointment of 
the SSB, still need to be addressed.  
The SSB in performing their duties rely heavily on the work of the IFI’s Shari’ah 
team/members which can jeopardize the quality of their independence. As per the AAOIFI 
Governance Standards (1.14), it is the responsibility of the SSB to provide an independent 
opinion based on their review of the operations of the IFI, and among the documents that are 
to be examined is the internal audit report. Hence, basing its opinion on the Internal Shari’ah 
Review reports raises the question on whether the SSB’s opinion report is comprehensive and 
independent as per the Standards. Moreover, even though the IFI’s Shari’ah team/member 
are supervised by the SSB, they fall under the IFI’s management and administration, which 
could have an effect on the quality of the information they provide.  On a similar note, 
concern is expressed by Shari’ah scholars about providing full information and an accurate 
picture while obtaining the SSB’s approval. Hence, this raises the question on whether all 
matters are reported and brought to the attention of the SSB by those performing the 
review?
17
 
                                                          
15 Currently, as per AAOIFI’s website: “Adaptation of Standards”, dated 30/4/2017, the AAOIFI Accounting Standards are 
mandatory in Bahrain, Oman and Qatar, and are voluntarily used in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and UAE.  
16 The Central Bank of Oman’s law is in line with AAOIFI Shari’ah governance standards, and places a requirement that an 
SSB member can only be appointed/selected for two consecutive terms. 
17 Consideration is to be given that it could also be related to audit/accounting matters, an area where the Shari’ah scholars 
are not necessarily knowledgeable in. This is an area to be considered for further study/research. 
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As the situation stands in the GCC (at the time of the study), the complete independence 
of the SSB members is questionable, even among the SSB members themselves. The SSB 
was a setup put forth initially as part of the IFI organizational structure as an independent 
board. However, time has shown that such independence is questionable, which places risk 
on the quality of the SSB’s role and purpose.  Recently, some regulators have moved towards 
strengthening Shari’ah governance and have created a central Shari’ah Board (SB) at the 
central bank. Instances where the SB’s role is to perform the function of SSBs for all IFIs 
would be a good, though incomplete, step towards the resolving the matter . There will still 
be Shari’ah scholars and Shari’ah compliance officers at the IFI level who will be 
performing Shari’ah reviews and making Shari’ah decisions.  
Indications from the study imply that regulators should consider disassociating the 
Shari’ah scholars/Shari’ah compliance officers’ remuneration from the IFI to achieve 
effective independence. Some suggestions of outsourcing the function have been made, yet 
that would not resolve it completely because the IFI would still be indirectly paying for their 
services. The recommendation is to establish an independent organization that provides these 
services. The organization could be funded by the membership fees that IFIs pay on an 
annual basis and in return such services of SSB members and Shari’ah compliance officers 
would be made available to all.   
The setup suggested above would contribute towards developing other related matters 
too. Both Shari’ah and financial/auditing know-how skills would be developed by the 
organization, ensuring the availability of the appropriate persons/skills/expertise. The 
organization can also work on unifying the TOR and define the roles and responsibilities of 
the SSB function. Furthermore, the external Shari’ah audit/review can be performed, 
resulting in an independent Shari’ah report. The quality of undertaking the compliance 
review and generating the compliance report could be developed and standardized among 
industry players.  This would also apply to the pronouncements being produced by the SSB, 
whereby detailed Shari’ah certifications on the investment/product would form part of the 
information and documentation provided to clients and investors. The independent 
report/review performed on the extent of Shari’ah compliance would enhance the quality of 
the report and the confidence of the stakeholders and would improve the credibility and 
reputation of the industry.  
 
31 
 
REFERENCES 
AAOIFI. (2015). Accounting, Auditing Governance Standards. Dar AlMaiman for Publishing 
and Distributing, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
Abu-Tapanjeh, A. (2009). Corporate Governance From the Islamic Perspective: A 
comparative Analysis with OECD Principles. Critiacal Perspectives on Accounting, 20(5), 
556-567. 
Adawiah,E. (2012). Legal Framework and Governance for Islamic Financial Services, Kuala 
Lumpur Islamic Finance Forum. Kuala Lumpur. 
Ahmed, H., (2011). Shari’ah Governance Regimes for Islamic Finance: Types and Appraisal, 
Economia Internazionale (International Economics), 64 (4), 393-412 
AlJifri, K., and Khandelwal, S. (2013). Financial Contracts in Conventional and Islamic 
Financial Institution: An Agency Theory Perspective. Review of Business and Finance 
Studies, 4(2), 79-88. 
Alkhamees, Ahmad (2012). The impact of Shari’ah governance practices on Shari’ah 
compliance in contemporary Islamic finance. Journal of Banking Regulation, 14 (2), 134-
163.  
 
Alman, M. (2012). Shari’ah Supervisory Board Composition Effects on Islamic Banks-Risk 
Taking Behaviour. SSRN Electronic Journal DOI:10.2139/ssm.2140042. 
 
Chapra, M. and Ahmed, H. (2002), Corporate Governance in Islamic Financial Institutions, 
Islamic Development Bank, Jeddah. 
 
DeHoyos, M. & Barnes, S., (2012). Analysing Interview Data, Warwick Institue for 
Employment Research. 
 
Garas, S. & Pierce, C. (2010). Shari’a Supervision of Islamic Financial Institutions. Journal 
of Financial Regulation and Compliance, 18(4), 386-407. 
Ginena, Karim (2014), “Shari’ah Risk and Corporate Governance of Islamic Banks”, 
Corporate Governance, 14 (1), 86-103 
Ginena, K. & Hamid, A. (2015). Foundations of Shari’ah Governance of Islamic Banks, John 
Wiley & Sons Ltd., West Sussex`, UK. 
Grassa, R. (2013). Shariah Supervisory Syatem in Islamic Financial Institutins: New Issues 
and Challenges: A Comparatarive Analysis Between Southeast Asia Models and GCC 
Models. Humanomics, 29(4), 333-348. 
Grais, W. & Pellegrini, M. (2006). Corporate Governance and Shari'ah Compliance in 
Institutions Offering Islamic Financial Services. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 
4054. 
32 
 
Hasan, Z. (2014). In Search of the Perception of the Shari’ah Scholars on Shari’ah Governace 
System. International Journal of Islamic and Middle Eastern Finance and Management, 
7(1), 22-36. 
Hamza, H. (2013). Shari'a Governance in Islamic Banks: Effectiveness and Supervision 
Model. International Journal of Islamic and Middle Eastern Finance and Management, 6(3), 
226-237. 
IFSB. (2009). Guiding Principles on Shari'ah Governance Syatems For Institutions Offering 
Islamic Financial Services-IFSB 10. 
Injas, M., Haron, M., Ramli, R., & Injas, R. (2016). The Importance of the Shari’ah 
Supervisory Boards (SSBS) in the Islamic Banking System. South East Asia Journal of 
Contemporary Business, Economics & Law, 9(2), 25-31. 
Iqbal, Zamir and Abbas Mirakhor (2004), Stakeholders Model of Governance in Islamic 
Economic System, Islamic Economic Studies, 11 (2), 43-63. 
Lahsasna, A., Ibrahim, S., & Othman, D. (n.d.). Shariah Audit: Evidence & Methodology in 
Islamic Finance, INCEIF Centre for Islamic Wealth Management. 
Malkawi, B. (2013). Shari’ah Board in the Governance Structure of Islamic Financial 
Institutions. The American Journal of Comparative Law, 61(3), 539-577. 
Nathan, S. (2010). The Performance of Shari’a Supervisory Boards Within Islamic Financial 
Institutions in the Gulf Cooperation Council Countries. Corporate Ownership & Control, 
8(1), 247-266. 
Rammal, H. (2006). The Importance of Shariah Supervision in IFIs. Corporate Ownership & 
Control, 3(3), 204-208. 
Rayan, G. & Russell, H. (2003). Techniques to Identify Themes, Field  Methods, 15( 1), 85-
109. 
Saif Alnasser, S. & Muhammed, J. (2012). Introduction to Corporate Governance From 
Islamic Perspective. Humanomics, 28(3), 220-231. 
Schreier, M. (1
st
). Qualitative Content Analysis in Practice, Sage Publications Ltd., London, 
UK. 
Shafii, Z., & Salleh, S. (2010). Enhancing Governance, Accountability and Transparency in 
Islamic Financial Institutions: AN Examination into the Audit of Shari’a Internal Control 
System. Malaysian Accounting Review, 9(2), 23-42. 
Suleiman, N. (2000). Corporate Governance in Islamic Banks. Arab Gateway, 98-116. 
Toufik, B. (2015). The Role of Shari’ah Supervisory Board in Ensuring Good Corporate 
Governance Practices in Islamic Banks. International Journal of Contemporary Applied 
Sciences, 2(2), 109-118. 
Ullah, S., Harwood, I., Jamali, D. (2016). Fatwa Repositioning: The Hidden Struggle for 
Shari’a Compliance Within Islamic Financial Institutions. Journal of Business Ethics, , DOI 
10.1007/s10551-016-3090-1. 
